
























Research Unit for Statistical
and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences (Hi-Stat)
Hi-Stat
Institute of Economic Research
Hitotsubashi University
2-1 Naka, Kunitatchi Tokyo, 186-8601 Japan
http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp
Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series
Research Unit for Statistical
and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences (Hi-Stat)
May 2011
The Optimal Dynamic Infant Industry Protection in
Joining a Free Trade Agreement:
A Numerical Analysis of 
the Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry
Tran Lam Anh Duong
191 
THE OPTIMAL DYNAMIC INFANT INDUSTRY PROTECTION 
 IN JOINING A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
- A Numerical Analysis of the Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry - 
 
 
Tran Lam Anh Duong
*







This paper investigates the optimal dynamic paths of trade protection imposed on infant 
industries during the process of joining a free trade agreement. The framework is based on the 
dynamic learning-by-doing model developed in Melitz (2005), where industries are experiencing 
dynamic externalities. In this framework, restricted-time protection is introduced as a realistic 
approach to correspond to the conditions of actual agreements. According to the computational 
analysis, in some feasible cases of optimal tariff paths may not follow a downward trend, as 
conventional wisdom  would  suggest.  The results  of  the  numerical simulation applied to the 
Vietnamese motorcycle industry support these findings. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
The last few decades have seen the rapid intensification of globalization with respect to 
trade. Members of global free trade organizations are steadily increasing.
1
Free  trade  agreements  unambiguously  lower  barriers to international trade, stimulate 
international transactions, and give consumers access to a greater variety of goods at lower prices. 
However,  there are some  concerns that free  trade  agreements may adversely affect infant 
industries. Throughout history, numerous countries have used tariff policies to protect infant 
industries, with greatly varying success. For example, Head (1994) and Zussman (2002) suggest, 
respectively, that the tariff protection provided to the United States steel rail industry and the 
Germany iron-steel industry from the 1850s to the 1950s helped to raise welfare and promoted 
development.  On the other hand, tariff protection for  the  Spanish iron and steel industry is 
regarded as having been harmful in Houpt (2002). 
 
The aim of this paper is to address the issue of when and how an infant industry should 
be protected during the process of joining a free trade agreement. More specifically, under the 
assumption that the infant industry is experiencing dynamic externalities, this paper investigates 
the question of  what a rational government should do to protect such  industry  before tariff 
barriers are reduced to a very low rate upon full commitment to a free trade regime. Generally, a 
free trade regime is a system of trade rules which includes detailed and lengthy tariff reduction 
schedules that are negotiated on the basis of generalized formulas. For example, according to the 
Swiss formula for agricultural free trade agreements of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
(Figure 1), after becoming a member of this association, a country has a period of about 5 to 7 
years to reduce tariffs to a level stipulated through the course of initial negotiations. 
The theoretical argument for infant industry protection is that it shields newly emergent 
industries from full exposure to international markets.  One of the first to put forward the 
                                                 
1 The WTO currently has 153 Member States, and 30 observers (observers must start accession negotiations within 
five years of becoming observers.)   3 
argument for infant industry protection was John Stuart Mill in the 19th century. Mill (1848) 
distinguished special circumstances, under which it may be beneficial to protect an industry: (1) 
the industry should exhibit dynamic learning tendencies which are external to individual firms; 
(2) any protection should be temporary; and (3) the industry must eventually become viable 
without protection.  In recent years, there  has  been  a  growing  literature,  both  empirical  and 
theoretical, on infant industries based on Mill’s argument. For instance, Harrison (1994) and 
Tybout (1992) empirically show that there is a significant positive correlation between increased 
protection and higher productivity growth. Head (1994), using a numerical simulation, shows 
that intervention had positive effects on welfare in the United State steel rail industry. In addition, 
there have been various theoretical studies modeling one aspect or other of the infant industry 
argument. Examples include Bardhan (1971), who provides a model of the learning effect in a 
dynamic framework, and Krugman (1987)  and Young (1991), who examine  the impact of 
learning spillovers across industries and countries. 
A theoretical model of particular interest in the context of the current study is the 
learning-by-doing model developed by Melitz (2005), which allows the comparison of three 
policy instruments, such as tariffs, subsidies, and quotas, that a hypothetical social planner could 
choose from. Melitz (2005) focuses specifically on a given industry’s learning potential, the 
shape of the learning curve, and the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign 
goods. His model encompasses sufficient properties of an infant industry, but is still simple 
enough to allow for the extension of these properties for the purpose of the present analysis. 
Specifically, this paper applies the model of Melitz (2005) to the process of a country 
joining the WTO. As mentioned above, participation in the WTO brings a lot of regulations, 
especially  time-based restrictions.  Melitz’s  model, however, does not incorporate any time 
restriction.  Rather,  in the model, the  social planner may protect  the  infant industry  until  it 
becomes mature. This clearly does not correspond to the situation in the actual world and for the 
analysis in the present paper, restricted-time protection is incorporated into Melitz’s model. The 
optimal tariff path during the protection period is derived using both analytical and numerical   4 
means. Analytically, there are three important factors that influence this path: (1) the slope of the 
demand curve, (2) the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, and (3) the shape of 
the learning curve. It is found that during the transition period before implementation of the trade 
agreement, the optimal tariff path, in contrast to conventional wisdom may show an upward 
trend for some feasible cases. In fact, the calibration of the model used in this paper to analyze 
the case of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry supports the analytical results by showing that 
the optimal tariff path over the protection period is upward sloping.  
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it is one of only a small number of papers 
which re-examine the current schedule of tariff reductions in the wake of Vietnam’s accession to 
the WTO.  Second,  the model and methodology can be generalized  for  adaptation  to  other 
countries and other industries. Furthermore, it is especially applicable to any country planning to 
take part in an optional free trade organization in the future. Third, the calibration exercise using 
real data offers explicit policy prescription for the protection process. Specifically, the calibration 
suggests that the optimal tariff path during the protection period may be upward sloping.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the infant industry 
protection model used in this study. Section 3 discusses the calibration. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2.   THE MODEL 
This  section presents  a model of  infant industry protection  where  the  industry is 
experiencing a dynamic learning effect. The model is based on that developed by Melitz (2005), 
but extends it in the following respects. First, incorporating the actual conditions of joining the 
WTO, the model also considers the time restriction when import tariff rates are committed to be 
reduced. In the real world, an infant industry does not have unlimited time to become mature 
before a country joins a free trade agreement. Second, all the functions used in the model are 
explicitly specified and some new assumptions are also included. Third, tariffs are the only tools 
available to the social planner to protect industry, as is the case under the rules of the WTO. 
Finally, time is assumed to be discrete.   5 
The basic assumptions of the model are as follows. Consider a world consisting of two 
countries, the home country and a foreign country. Firms in both countries are price-takers. The 
home country is assumed to be a semi-open economy that only imports goods in order to satisfy 
insufficiencies of domestic supply and does not export. On the other hand, only the foreign 
country’s exports to the home country are taken into account here. Only in the home country are 
there learning effects in the industry. 
 
2.1  The model 
2.1.1  Learning function 
The home  country’s total production at time t ,  is denoted by  t q , while  the foreign 
country’s production exported to the home country is denoted by  t q ~ . Both are assumed to be 
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 and total production in one period of time can be written as follows: 
1 − − = t t t Q Q q                             (1) 
The home country’s industry is assumed to be an infant industry, where marginal cost at 
time t, t c  , is a decreasing function of cumulative production  t Q  as the industry is experiencing 
dynamic learning effects which are external to firms. This marginal cost function (i.e. learning 
function) is specified as follows: 







　 a aQ b Q c t t 0 ), exp( ) (







                              (2) 
Here, once cumulative production begins to exceed the threshold level Q , the industry is mature 
and produces at a constant marginal cost c  as learning ceases. Meanwhile, in the foreign country, 
the industry is assumed to be mature and no longer experiencing learning effects. It produces at a 
constant marginal cost c ~  for the entire time. Also, the foreign good is an imperfect substitute for 
the domestic one.  
  Both countries value output at its current marginal cost as follows:   6 
Home:    ) exp( ) ( t t t aQ b Q c p − = =                          (3) 
Foreign:  t t c p τ + = ~ ~        
where  t p  is the price of the domestic good;  t p ~  is the price of the imported good, and  t τ  denotes 
the import tariff rate. 
In the model, the social planner in the home country is assumed to use import tariffs as 
the only instrument to protect the domestic industry against international trade. As mentioned 
above, the time when all tariffs must be reduced is given. This point of time is denoted as T . 
Before this time arrives, the social planner can protect the domestic industry by imposing import 
tariffs; but after this time, tariffs must be reduced to a level fixed by the requirements of the 
WTO agreement. Thus, the above foreign price can be re-written as follows: 
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2.1.2  Domestic demand and utility functions  
The domestic demand side of this model is assumed such that there is a representative 
consumer who generates this demand, consuming both domestic and imported goods. Her utility 
function is also assumed to have a symmetric quadratic form which can be written as follows: 
    0 , ; 0 , , ~ ~ ) ~ ( ) ~ , ( 2 1 2 1
2 2 > < + + + + = α α η β α α η β 　　 q q q q q q q q U t t t t t t t t                     (5) 
  This utility function forms a hump-shaped curve, of with the side to the right of the peak 
decreases as  t q or  t q ~  rise.
2
t q
 Due to the non-decreasing property of the utility function, in order to 
eliminate this decreasing segment, two additional conditions are imposed on  and t q ~ :   




















                                                 
2 The signs of β  , η  ,  1 α  and  2 α  are explained below.    7 
Given  that t p and  t p ~  represent  positive prices,  the problem of the representative 
consumer is to maximize her benefit, which is obtained by subtracting the cost of domestic and 
imported goods from the utility derived from consuming them, i.e.: 
   ( ) t t t t t t t q p q p q q U CB ~ ~ ~ , − − =                    (6) 
The  first-order necessary conditions  for  the benefit-optimization problem, 
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  In these two demand functions,  β 2  represents the slope of the demand curve and must 
therefore be negative ( 0 2 < β ), while  β η 2  represents the substitutability between the foreign 
and the domestic good, meaning  that  η  must  be negative and lie between  β 2  and  zero 
( ∈ η [ ] 0 , 2β ). On the other hand, because the first and the second factors on the right hand side of 
equations (7) and (8) are negative,  1 α  and  2 α  must be positive to keep prices positive. 
 
2.1.3   Domestic welfare and policy 
  Domestic welfare at time t is given by the sum of the domestic consumer benefit and 
tariff revenue, that is: 
t t t t q CB TW ~ τ + =  
Using the price valuation functions and the consumer benefit function, total welfare can 
be re-written as: 
( ) t t t t t t q c q c q q U TW ~ ~ ~ , − − =  
The problem of the social planner is to maximize the sum of discounted domestic welfare 
over time. Thus, the social planner’s problem can be written as: 
                          ( ) ( ) [ ] t t t t t
t
t


















Φ ∈ 　              (9)   8 
where  + ⊆ Φ R t  is the feasible cumulative domestic consumption at time t  and  ) 1 ( 1 r +  is the 
exogenous discount rate. The social planner thus solves the above optimization problem subject 
to equation (1). 
 
2.2  Analytical computation 
Solving the social planner’s problem above,
3
                         (10) 
 the tariff rate can be derived as: 
 
The last three terms on the right-hand side of equation (10) are constant, so that attention 
is paid only to the first two terms. The coefficient of the first term is positive,
4
t τ
 showing the 
monotonically increasing relationship between   and  t q . On the other hand, the second term 
clearly shows the monotonic decreasing relationship between  t τ  and  t Q . The trend  of the 
optimal tariff path depends on which term is dominant. Concretely, if the first term increases 
faster than the second, the optimal tariff path will show an upward trend, and vice versa. Three 
exogenous  factors that influence this dominance,  the  substitutability between domestic and 
foreign goods ( β η 2 ), the slope of the demand curve ( β 2 ), and the learning proficiency (a) are 
considered.  
First, ceteris paribus, it is found that the steeper the slope of the demand curve ( β 2 ), the 
more dominant the first term becomes (and therefore, the more likely it is that the tariff path 









2 2 .  Thus, when  β η 2  and  a  remain  constant,  if  β 2  is  large  enough, the 
increase in the first term  dominates,  and  the optimal tariff path shows  an upward trend. 
Intuitively, the steeper the slope of the demand curve, the less responsive demand is to price. In 
                                                 
3 The solution is presented in Appendix A. 
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τ  9 
such cases, an increase in tariffs to protect the domestic good does not distort welfare much. 
Therefore, the social planner has an incentive to increase tariffs. 
Second,  ceteris paribus, the higher the substitutability between the  domestic and the 
foreign good  ( β η 2 ), the more the first term  dominates. When  β η 2  increases, the first 
coefficient of equation (10) rises while the second one falls. If  β η 2  is sufficiently large, it is 
still possible that the first term completely dominates. Intuitively, when there is a foreign bias in 
consumption, substitutability between domestic and foreign goods is high, so that despite a rise 
in tariffs, demand for foreign good does not decrease much. Therefore, the price distortion to 
welfare caused by high tariff rate will be less pronounced. 
Last but not least, one of the most important factors deciding the trend of the tariff path is 
the learning proficiency of this industry (a). In fact, imposing tariffs in any case leads to welfare 
distortions in that it will limit consumers’ access to goods at lower prices. If learning is slow, it 
takes time for the industry to become sufficiently mature to balance out these  distortions, 
meaning that the welfare distortion becomes more pronounced and the higher the tariff is set. 
Under these circumstances, there is a tendency for the negative effect of the second term to 
dominate.  But if learning is fast enough, marginal costs  decrease  rapidly  as  the  industry  in 
question develops, so that the reduction in prices cancels out the effects of a high tariff. As a 
result, the positive effect of the first part will tend to be more dominant. Mathematically, as 
shown in equation (10), when a is low (as in the case of slow learning), the second term is less 
likely to dominate, so that there is a possibility that the tariff path will exhibit an upward trend. 
All things considered, the possibility of an upward-sloping  tariff path,  in contrast to 
conventional wisdom, cannot be rejected. To examine this issue in practice, the next section 
introduces a numerical example of an upward-sloping tariff path – the case of the Vietnamese 
motorcycle industry.  
 
3  CALIBRATION 
This section calibrates the above model to the Vietnamese motorcycle industry using data   10 
from 1998  to 2007. The  Vietnamese motorcycle industry is chosen for analysis for several 
reasons. First, Vietnam is a developing country, heavily dependent on international trade
5
A second reason for focusing on the motorcycle industry is that this is an industry which 
uses advanced technology and can therefore be considered to offer steep learning effects. In 
addition, the protection afforded to the motorcycle industry by the Vietnamese government is 
quite substantial, with a tariff rate as high as 90% on imported finished good, and a lower rate of 
30% on imported parts. Moreover, due to the tariff-reduction process of the WTO detailed above, 
the tariff rate on finished good must be reduced to 60% by 2012. 
 since 
the “Doi Moi reforms” initiated in 1986, and home to many infant industries which have been 
“born”  recently. Almost all of these  are now under the tariff  protection of the  Vietnamese 
government,  such as  the  motorcycle industry,  the  electronics  industry  and  the  shipbuilding 
industry. However, on 11 January 2007, Vietnam officially became the WTO’s 150th member 
and will have to comply with the tariff-cutting schedule set by the WTO and applied to all 
developing countries. This schedule indicates the time and scale of cuts for each member country 
of the WTO. Specifically, after a stipulated time from formal accession, countries have to reduce 
their protective tariffs to levels which are calculated on the basis of tariff levels at the time of 
joining. 
 
3.1   Description of model parameters 
There are twelve  model parameters:  β 2  (the  slope of the  demand curve),  β η 2 (the 
substitutability between the domestic and the foreign good),  1 α ,  2 α (the free parameters of the 
demand curve), a, b (the coefficients of the learning function),  ) 1 ( 1 r + (the exogenous discount 
rate), c (the marginal cost of the domestic industry after it becomes mature) , c ~ (the marginal 
cost of the foreign industry),  0 Q (initial cumulative production), Q (the cumulative production of 
                                                 
5 The ratio of imports and exports to GDP for Vietnam in 2007 was 90% and 77%, respectively (Source: World 
Development Indicators).   11 




 Each of the parameters is now discussed in turn. 
Parameters in the demand functions 
  β , η,  1 α  and  2 α : Coefficients of the demand functions:  
 
 
The problem here is that β  and η appear in both equations, meaning that these equations 
cannot be estimated separately or each of them will result in different values for a parameter. 
Therefore, to estimateβ , η,  1 α  and  2 α , the bootstrapping method is used in the simultaneous 
least squares estimation of the two demand functions. The least squares estimation function here 
has the form ( ) ( ) [ ] ∑ − + + + − + +
t





~ ~ 2 ~ 2 α β η α η β . The estimated results ofβ , η, 
1 α  and  2 α  here and their standard deviations were computed directly from the data and from 
each of 1,000 bootstrap samples. The data used in this estimation are domestic price, domestic 
production, foreign price, and foreign production over the period 1998-2007.  
 
Parameters in the learning function 
  a, b : Coefficients of learning function  t t aQ b p − = ln  (derived from (2)). Because there 
are only 10 observations, normal OLS estimation does not yield a significant result. Thus, to 
calculate the values of a and b , it is assumed that the connection between the logarithm of the 
price and cumulative production between 1998 and 2007 is linear. The values of a and b  can 
then be calculated. 
 
 
                                                 
6 The data on the Vietnamese motorcycle industry used in the calibration are described in Appendix B. 
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Cumulative production 
  0 Q : 1998 is the first year of the analysis; thus, production in 1998 is assumed to be the 
initial cumulative production. 
  Q : calculated using a, b  and c  employing equation (3).    
 
Marginal cost when industry becomes mature 
  c  : This value is calculated from the average price, excluding tariffs, of motorcycles 
imported from three countries, Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia, in the year 2007. These three 
countries are chosen because their motorcycle industries were “born” nearly half a century ago, 
and the production and exports of the motorcycle industry in these three countries have been 
stable over the last few years. Thus, in these countries, the motorcycle market is stable, and the 
motorcycle industries can be considered mature industries.  
  c ~ : This value is assumed to be equal to c , that is, marginal costs are assumed to be the 
same at home and abroad when the industry is mature. 
 
Other parameters 
r : the annual demand deposit interest rate is used. 
  τ : calculated as  c rate ~ × = τ  , using the tariff rate required by the WTO when the time 
for tariff reduction comes. This rate is 60%, as mentioned earlier. 
The calibrated parameter values are reported in Table 1. 
 
3.2   Findings 
This section reports the results of the calibration.
7
                                                 
7 A description of the numerical exercises is provided in Appendix C. 
 The first issue of interest is the 
appropriateness of the time horizon for the loosening of trade barriers in the Vietnamese 
motorcycle industry. The calibration results show that this industry needs more time to develop   13 
before the tariff is greatly reduced. In other words, the implication for the government is that it 
should continue to protect the motorcycle industry for a few more years. This is illustrated in 
Figure 2, which shows  the  tariff  rates of simulated time periods corresponding  to different 
committed tariff-reduction times  T . As the value of  T  extends, the  level of tariff  paths 
corresponding to each T  decreases. Intuitively, the shorter the time constraint T  for lowering 
tariff barriers, the less time the infant industry has to prepare for free trade, and the greater 
therefore the protection it needs before T comes. This extra protection is reflected in the tariff 
rates from the initial point in time to time T . Comparing the magnitude of the hypothetical tariff 
rates with the actual rate leads to the conclusion that the industry needs more protection. More 
specifically, when there are 5 years to go until tariffs are reduced, as in the case of the actual 
situation (from 2007 to 2012), i.e., when T  is equal to 5 years, the initial tariff rate (the tariff rate 
in 2007) is about 800%, which is much higher than the actual current rate of 90%. This means 
that the current rate is too low and that in order to both protect industry and maximize total 
welfare over time, the government would have to impose a higher tariff rate on imports than it 
currently does. As Figure 2 shows, the longer the tariff-reduction time T  is, the more that initial 
tariff rate can be reduced. According to this analysis, the optimal T that corresponds to the 
current tariff level (90%) is 8 years. This means that the Vietnamese motorcycle industry needs 8 
years of protection rather than the 5 years granted under the WTO schedule. Thus, the analysis 
suggests that in the case of this particular industry, accession to the WTO has come slightly too 
early. 
The second issue of interest here is the optimal tariff path for when trade barriers are 
removed, which is also presented in Figure 2. Specifically, the figure shows the optimal tariff 
path for different values of T and, as can be readily seen, is slightly upward sloping in all cases. 
As discussed in Subsection 2.2, this upward trend may result from the steep slope of the demand 
curve, the foreign bias, low learning proficiency, or a combination of the three. 
  Corresponding to the upward-sloping  tariff path during the protection period, the 
transition paths of other variables such as domestic production  and  imports  are explored in   14 
Figure 3 with T set to T=6 and the total period falling into three distinct phases.  
The first phase is the time before tariffs are reduced. During this phase, imports follow a 
downward trend while domestic production follows an upward trend. These divergent trends can 
be explained by tariff protection and the learning effect. As indicated in Figure 2, since the 
government imposes a rising tariff on imports, the foreign good declines in competitiveness due 
to the resulting higher prices. Meanwhile, the learning effect improves the competitiveness of 
domestic product by  decreasing marginal cost.  Thus,  the upward-sloping  trend in domestic 
production can be attributed to a combination of both the protective trade policy and the learning 
effect. 
Following the first phase, the second phase consists of the period from the reduction of 
the import tariff rate to a certain target level to the point at which the industry reaches maturity. 
This reduction of the import tariff rate is in line with the initial agreement formed upon joining 
the WTO, and the resulting tariff rate is quite low relative to the current one. Therefore, if the 
prices of imports fall due to the lowering of the tariff rate, demand for foreign products, and 
hence imports, will rise. Consequently, foreign production during this period clearly shows an 
upward trend. But the most surprising result here is that although protective barriers are lowered, 
domestic production still shows a slight upward trend following the small drop in the very first 
stage of this phase. This can be explained by the predominance of the learning effect over the 
effect of increased competition through imports. 
  During the last phase, once the industry has matured, domestic production and imports 
remain constant at the level of the last stage of the second period. At this stage,  t Q  becomes Q , 
and  ) exp( aQ b c − =  is equal to c  or c ~ . As a result,  t q  becomes  q as well. The same thing 
happens to  t q ~  and  t q ~ .  
  Thus, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, the Vietnamese motorcycle industry 
is still far from mature. This suggests that increased protection from the government is needed to 
guarantee successful development in the face of international competition. Second, in contrast to 
conventional wisdom, the optimal tariff path computed here shows an upward trend until the   15 
time of tariff reduction arrives. In other words, as long as the tariff protection instrument is still 
available and the  infant  industry  is  still  experiencing learning externalities,  the  government 
should continue to raise tariffs without worrying that the high tariff may limit consumers’ access 
to good at a  lower price  as  the  simultaneously  rising  learning  effect  will  counteract such 
distortions.  
 
4  CONCLUSION  
The purpose of this paper was to examine the infant industry protection policies of a 
country that is going to join a free trade organization. The paper presented a simple learning-by-
doing model to illustrate the relationship between the market mechanism and infant industry 
protection policy under the assumptions that (1) the industry is experiencing dynamic learning 
effects and (2) the social planner has committed itself to lowering tariffs to a stipulated level by a 
specified point of time in the future. Thus, the social planner can use tariff protection as a policy 
instrument only until that future point in time. The goal therefore is to protect the industry and to 
maximize total welfare within this allotted time period.  
Against this background, the model developed here was used to derive an optimal tariff 
path based on the condition of a specific tariff-reduction commitment made upon joining a free 
trade agreement. Through the computation, the shape of this optimal tariff path is found to be 
determined by certain exogenous factors. More specifically, if the slope of the demand curve is 
sufficiently steep or a strong foreign bias exists, or if learning proficiency is low, an upward-
sloping tariff path could result. This result is quite different from the conventional wisdom that 
the government should gradually reduce the tariff rate to reach to the stipulated level right at the 
committed time. 
In the next step of the analysis, the model was calibrated  using actual data on the 
Vietnamese motorcycle industry. The contribution of this numerical approach is twofold. First, 
this is one of a small number of studies which re-examine the current schedule of tariff 
reductions in the wake of Vietnam’s accession to the WTO. Second, the model and methodology   16 
can be generalized for  adaptation  to  other countries and  other industries. Furthermore, it is 
especially applicable to any country planning to take part in a free trade organization in the 
future. Third, the calibration exercise using actual data offers an optimal tariff path as an explicit 
policy prescription for the protection process. Last but not least, this calibration also supports to 
the result of analytical computation by suggesting that the optimal tariff path during the 
protection period may be upward sloping.  
Finally, a number of limitations and possible extensions should be mentioned. First, the 
model used here is based on the assumption that the economy is just semi-open. In the real world, 
it is possible for infant industries to export, while mature sectors already engage in the import of 
goods that are competing with domestic products. In addition, the model would be more realistic 
if it were extended so as to deal with more than two open economies.  
Second, the object of analysis for this study is an infant industry which is experiencing 
learning effects. However, a common problem when examining real-world cases is that, because 
infant industries by definition are very young, available data are limited. For example, the data 
on the Vietnamese motorcycle industry used in this study only cover the period from 1998 to 
2007, thus consisting of annual observations for just 10 years. This limitation may have some 
influence on key parameters of the estimation.  
 
APPENDIX A: THE COMPUTATION 
This appendix presents the computation of the transition path of all variables. According 
to the model, the social planner has to maximize total domestic welfare over time. However, 
after the industry matures, the value of all variables will remain constant with any learning speed. 
For example, welfare W will stay at W permanently after the industry becomes mature. Thus, in 
fact, the social planner only needs to maximize cumulative welfare until a certain time in the 
future. This time period is given by the shortest time in which an industry with any learning 
speed, even the slowest one, can become mature. This future time is denoted as  max t . More 
specifically, total domestic welfare maximized by the social planner can be divided into three   17 
phases. The first phase is defined as the period from the current time until the committed time to 
reduce tariffs. During this period, the social planner uses import tariffs as the only instrument to 
protect the infant industry and maximize total welfare. The second phase is defined as the period 
from right after the first period until learning ceases. During this phase, the infant industry has 
not yet become mature and marginal costs still decrease as cumulative production rises. Finally, 
the third phase is defined as the period from right after the industry becomes mature until  max t . 
Neither learning effects nor protection are any longer present and total domestic production at 
any time t in this period is constant ( q qt = ). The second and third phases have in common that 
the  social planner no  longer has  instruments to protect industry. However, as the foregoing 
makes clear, the calculation of welfare differs for each phase, reflecting the different policy and 
industry circumstances. 
First phase 
During the first phase, the social planner can continue using import tariffs as a policy 
instrument to protect the industry and to  maximize social welfare. Let L  be the Lagrangian 
associated with this problem: 
 
 
And the first order conditions are as follows: 
                             (A.1) 
                                       (A.2)  
     
                            (A.3) 
Second phase 
During this phase, the industry is still immature but no longer enjoys tariff protection. 
























α τ η β
η β
c e Q Q
t aQ b
t t             (A.4) 



























































　 c e q
t aQ b






+ − + −
−
=
− ~ 2 2
2 4















=  18 
Third phase 
The third phase is the period when the industry has reached maturity, i.e. the industry has 
reached a steady state and total domestic production at any time t in this period is constant. The 
solution  for domestic production and imports  during this phase is also computed by the 
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As mentioned above, tariffs as a policy instrument are available to the social planner only 
during the first phase, so that it is the policy choice during this phase that determines the welfare 
for the entire period. This policy choice is derived through the level of cumulative production at 
the end of  the first phase,  T Q .  Thus, the key factor in this dynamic  model is  T Q ,  which 
determines the production levels in the following phases. Therefore, total welfare for the three 
phases as a whole can be calculated through  T Q , and obviously, the optimal  T Q  is the value 
which maximizes total welfare. As a result, the key object here is to find the optimal T Q . This, 
however, cannot be done analytically and what is required instead is a numerical approach. This 
is done in Appendix C. 
 
APPENDIX B: DATA 
  This appendix provides details on the data used for the calibration exercise. Specifically, 
the data used cover the period 1998-2007. The Vietnamese motorcycle industry was “born” in 
1995, with the next two years devoted to building necessary infrastructure, so that there was very 
little actual production during this period. For example, in 1997, Honda Vietnam produced only 
73 motorcycles in total. Therefore, in order to obtain significant parameter estimates, data from 
1998 are used. Meanwhile, the latest available data are for 2007. 
  Data sources for domestic production, imports, domestic prices, foreign prices, current 
import tariff rates, and the annual demand deposit interest rate are described in Table A.1.    19 
APPENDIX C: DESCRIPTION OF THE NUMERICAL EXERICISES 
This appendix describes the numerical simulation to obtain the optimal  T Q . The first task 
is to clarify the potential intervals for  T Q .  They  must lie between the initial  cumulative 
production  level 0 Q  and the cumulative production attained when learning ceases,  Q ,  or 
] , [ 0 Q Q QT ∈ . Assume that  ] , [ 0 Q Q  is a discrete interval containing multiple values.  
Second, with each of these values, a shooting algorithm is used to compute all values of 
cumulative production from initial cumulative production  0 Q  to production at time T ,  T Q . With 
this information, total welfare for the first phase, denoted as  1 W , can be calculated. 
Third,  the cumulative production function derived from  equation (A.4)  is used to 
compute all cumulative production in the second phase from  T Q  and to then calculate the total 
welfare for this phase,  2 W .  
Fourth, during the third phase when cumulative product has exceeded the threshold level 
Q , production in each period t will remain constant, as shown in equations (A.5) and (A.6), so 
that welfare for each of these periods is also the same. As a result, the total welfare for the third 
phase,  3 W , is calculated as the sum of the constant value for each period during this phase. The 
longer this third phase lasts, the higher the welfare  3 W  is. The length of this phase depends on 
the learning speed which mainly determines whether the industry will mature early or late.  
Finally, cumulative production at time T ,  T Q , is calculated to find the maximum welfare 
for  all three periods ( 3 2 1 W W W TW + + = ).  The optimal  value of  T Q  which maximizes  total 
welfare can be observed among its potential intervals  ] , [ 0 Q Q  in Figure A.1.  
Figure A.1 shows a hump-shaped curve which represents the relationship between TW  
and  T Q .  Cumulative production at time  T ,  T Q  ,  which  is where  total welfare reaches  its 
maximum, lies somewhere in the middle of its potential interval,  ] , [ 0 Q Q . In this case, optimal 
T Q  is 17,700 thousand motorcycles. 
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Fig. 1. The Swiss formula of the WTO applied to current agriculture negotiations (See WTO 
Agriculture Negotiations (2003)). 
 
 
Table 1     Calibration parameters 
Parameter  Value 
β   -178.33 [47.3] 
η  -82.5 [76.25] 
1 α   1,664,139.94 [156,583.38] 
2 α   1,614,757.08 [79,260.59] 
a  0.000045 
b   14.56 
r   0.041 
c   535,795.7 (USD per thousand motorcycles) 
c ~   535,795.7 (USD per thousand motorcycles) 
0 Q   12,790 (thousand motorcycles) 
Q   30,410.93 (thousand motorcycles) 
τ   321,477.4 (USD per thousand motorcycles) 


















































































Fig. 3.  Domestic production, import, and tariff paths over time. 
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Fig. A.1. Total welfare for different values of  T Q . 
 
Table A.1    Data 
Name of Variable  Source 
Domestic production ( t q )  General Statistics Office Of Vietnam (GSO). 
Import ( t q ~ )  Until 2001 : Calculated by the author based on motorcycle 
registration  data  from  the  Ministry of Public Security of 
Vietnam and domestic production data from the GSO 
From 2001: World Trade Atlas. 
Domestic price ( t p )  Calculated by the author. Weighted average price of three 
companies: Honda Vietnam, FDI without Honda Vietnam 
and domestic companies (state and non-state). 
・ Price data: The price of the main product line for 
each sector  is used. Data source: until  2001 
“Vietnam Automotive News”;  from  2001  Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and 
Hanoi National Economics University (NEU) (*). 
・ Share data: Calculated using  production data for 
Honda  from  “2008 World Motorcycle Facts & 
Figures” and domestic and  FDI production data 
from the GSO. 
Import price ( t p ~ )  World Trade Atlas 
Current Tariff ( 0 τ )  General Department of Vietnam Customs 
Treasury Bill Rate (r )  International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
(*) See Ministry of Industry of Vietnam (2007) 
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